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Defining Characteristics and Politicising Victims:
A Legal Perspective
Jennifer Schweppe
University of Limerick
ABSTRACT
Legislatures worldwide experience the same problem in drafting or
amending hate crimes statutes: How is it possible to discriminate between
victim groups, and which groups are worthy of legislative protection?
This article explores some of the experiences of legislatures, highlighting
the political inconsistencies which go on to shape the legal system. It
focusses on the experience of a number of common law jurisdictions,1
and seeks to establish a normative platform from which hate crimes stat-
utes can be based, drawing on the legislative experiences of the United
States. This platform draws on two other areas of law, particularly the
criminal defence of provocation and equality legislation, and shows that
the determination of victim groups for hate crimes legislation need not be
the politically charged, discriminatory, and exclusionary process that it is
today.
Keywords: victims, legislation, legal approaches, equality,
comparative
I. INTRODUCTION
Legislatures worldwide experience the same problem in drafting or
amending hate crimes statutes: How is it possible to discriminate between
victim groups, and which groups are worthy of legislative protection? This
article seeks to explore some of the experiences of legislatures, highlighting
the political inconsistencies which go on to shape the legal system. It
focusses on the experience of a number of common law jurisdictions,2 and
seeks to establish a normative platform on which hate crimes statutes can be
based, drawing on the legislative experiences of the United States. This
platform will draw on two other areas of law, particularly the criminal
defence of provocation and equality legislation, and show that the determi-
nation of victim groups for hate crimes legislation need not be the politi-
cally charged, discriminatory, and exclusionary process that it is today.
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II. VICTIMS, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, AND HATE
CRIMES LEGISLATION
Traditionally, the only role for the victim in the criminal justice system
was as a witness for the prosecution. However, the discipline of vic-
timology has developed prominence in recent years, and as a result of calls
for change in the role of the victim, many accommodations have been made
for victims in the system.3 When considering the role of victims in the con-
text of hate crimes, the perspective is a little different. Rather than consider-
ing the role of victims in the criminal justice system as a whole, we are
instead considering a more contentious issue: the ranking of victims. As
Chakraborti and Garland note:
The increased standing for victims clearly has implications for the devel-
opment of hate crime, for it is within this context that we have begun to
appreciate the differential impact of certain forms of crime upon particu-
lar groups of victim. Indeed, this would appear to be one of the key
underlying premises of hate crime: that crimes motivated by hatred or
prejudice against certain groups of people deserve particular attention.4
In terms of the victims’ movement, hate crimes could be considered the
ultimate victim-led offence. While generally speaking, crimes are ranked in
severity by assessing the objective severity of the offence (for example,
assault, assault causing harm, assault causing serious harm5), hate crimes
are punished more harshly due to the motivation of the offender, the subjec-
tive experience of the victim, and the impact the crime has on the commu-
nity with which the victim identifies.
III. TWO DEFINITIONS
Barbara Perry defines hate crimes from a criminological perspective in
this way:
Hate crime . . . involves acts of violence and intimidation, usually
directed toward already stigmatized and marginalized groups. As such, it
is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the preca-
rious hierarchies that characterize a given social order. It attempts to re-
create simultaneously the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the
perpetrator’s group and the ‘appropriate’ subordinate identity of the vic-
tim’s group. It is a means of marking both the Self and the Other in such
a way as to reestablish their ‘proper’ relative positions, as given and
reproduced by broader ideologies and patterns of social and political
inequality.’6
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More concisely, she encapsulates her definition later as ‘violence motivated
by negative interpretations of difference and the demonization of the
Other.’7 What is very useful about this definition, as Chakraborti and Gar-
land observe, is the recognition that hate crime is not a static problem, but is
‘historically and culturally contingent, the experience of which needs to be
seen as a dynamic social process involving context, structure and agency.’8
For the purposes of enacting legislation, however, the concept of ‘othering’
is rather too vague to withstand judicial scrutiny. Nonetheless, the defini-
tion is useful for legal purposes, including as it does the key elements of
any hate crime: violence, or some form of criminal conduct; against a vic-
tim; who was targeted due to his affiliation with a stigmatised and
marginalised group.
In the United States, Frederick Lawrence sought to determine which
status characteristics should be included in hate crimes statutes and which
should not. He proposed a two-stage process: first, to determine the charac-
teristics which are appropriate for consideration; and second, how the legis-
lature should, or could, distinguish between these groups for the purposes of
enacting hate crimes legislation.9 The first question asks whether the mem-
bers of the group self-identify as such members. Lawrence admits that this
first stage will identify a great many number of groups, some of which have
no place in a bias crimes statute. He argues, however, that in this stage,
‘where we seek characteristics that yield self-regarding groups, we should
be expansive.’10
The second stage, then, requires the legislature to determine which of
these self-identifying groups should be included in the bias crimes statute.
These, he states, ‘are the characteristics that implicate social fissure lines,
divisions that run deep in the social history of a culture.’11 In the context of
the United States, for example, he highlights race and racial discrimination:
‘the greatest American dilemma has its roots in slavery, the greatest Ameri-
can tragedy.’12  He further observes that ‘race, color, ethnicity, religion and
national origin’ are all examples of such national social fissure lines.13 Hav-
ing established those national fissure lines, he goes on to note that particular
states may include characteristics particular to the social and historical con-
text of that state. While this approach has merits, it lacks a normative basis,
and allows politicians to discriminate, for valid or less meritorious reasons,
between victim groups. It also potentially requires politicians to be purely
reactive in their approach to hate crimes legislation, without the capacity to
proactively protect new vulnerable groups.
Thus, while there are clear theories as to how the legislature should
determine victim groups, in practice, the process is not as well thought-out
as Lawrence would require, nor as objective as it could be. Many hate
crimes statutes are created, not out of an evidence-based objective
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approach, but rather as the result of sustained lobbying on the part of partic-
ular interest groups.14 While there is little cause to question their entitle-
ment to be afforded the protection of a bias crimes statute, one must
immediately ask: Are there other groups who simply do not have the
resources required to sustain a lengthy battle to be afforded such protection?
IV. THE ‘BREADTH OF THE PROTECTED CLASSES’
Hate crimes differ from ‘ordinary crimes’ in a number of ways, but
perhaps one of the most compelling differences, from the perspective of
victims, is that they were chosen as a victim, not because of who they are,
but rather because of their membership of, or perceived membership of, a
particular group. As Perry notes, for the perpetrator of such violence, the
specific victim is immaterial, and the victims interchangeable.15 Blake
observes that central to bias crimes is the ‘fungible’ or interchangeable
nature of the victim.16 This deindividualisation of the victim plays a central
role in bias crimes. That said, the group that the individual is from, or is
perceived to be from, is deliberately chosen because of the ‘hatred’ of that
group.  Bowling and Phillips remark that this targeting, rather than being
picked at random from the population as a whole, creates feelings of hostil-
ity and tension, which make both the victim and the community feel vulner-
able to future attacks.17
Determining which victim groups should be protected by legislation,
however, is a highly problematic process. Grattet and Jenness observe that
including a group within the legislation serves to demarcate the ‘enhanced
vulnerabilities’ of some people, and inscribe victim statuses to some minor-
ity groups and not others.18  Further, as Perry notes, the definition is rela-
tive, and historically and culturally contingent–what, she says, is a hate
crime today could be ‘standard operating procedure’ in another time or
place.19
Chakraborti further notes that limiting the application of hate crimes
legislation to certain groups and not others ‘is a process fraught with dan-
ger, as this requires difficult judgements to be made regarding who should
be deserving of ‘special protection.’20  Jacobs and Potter note that while
offenders probably have conscious or unconscious prejudices against peo-
ple who are, for example, rich, poor, successful, or drug addicts, these
prejudices would not turn an ordinary crime into a hate crime.21 ‘By con-
trast,’ they note, ‘racial, religious, and gender prejudices are widely and
vigorously condemned.’22  By choosing those crimes which are more
widely condemned, we as a society are making a judgment on which vic-
tims deserve more protection, or which ground of discrimination is more
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heinous. It is this process, preferring one ground of discrimination over
another, which is the problem faced by legislatures.
If we examine hate crimes legislation across a broader category of
jurisdictions, it is clear that the range of victims of hate crimes is much
greater than those included in any one statute.  Those common to most
jurisdictions include race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and disability. Perry
describes the ‘breadth of the protected classes,’ which are culturally and
socially dependent.23 A list of protected classes across a wide range of hate
crimes legislation in the United States includes:
• Age
• Citizenship
• Class
• Colour
• Disability
• Economic  status
• Ethnicity
• Family responsibility
• Gender
• Matriculation
• Membership of Labour organisation
• Marital status
• National origin
• Personal appearance
• Political orientation or affiliation
• Race
• Religion
• Sex
• Sexual orientation
• Social status
Grattet and Jenness observe that there have been two ‘tiers’ of catego-
ries of hate crimes in the United States. The first (or core) tier, they note, in
1988 ‘represented a legal response to the most visible, recognizable, and
stereotypical kinds of discriminatory behavior,’ including crimes against
individuals on the basis of their race, religion, colour and national origin.
The so-called ‘second tier’ of hate categories, emerging in the late 1990s,
included sexual orientation, gender, and disabilities. The authors explain the
movements:
The respective unfolding of these clusters of statuses—the core and the
second tier—reflects the history of various post-1960s civil rights move-
ments in the United States. Race, religion, color, and national origin
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reflect the early legal contestation of minorities’ status and rights . . .
Because the gay and lesbian movement, the women’s movement, and the
disability movement reflect a ‘second wave’ of civil rights activism and
‘identity politics,’ sexual orientation, gender and disability, respectively,
have only recently been recognised by policy-makers responsible for the
formulation of hate crime law as legitimate axes around which hate crime
occurs.24
The range of potential protected classes is thus potentially very broad, rang-
ing from the traditionally protected groups (race, colour, national origin),
developing into Grattet and Jenness’ second wave, with the capability of a
third wave of potential protected groups emerging today. The remainder of
this paper will assess how, if at all, we can distinguish normatively between
potential victim groups to determine which are deserving of legislative pro-
tection through hate crimes legislation.
V. THE POLITICS OF VICTIMHOOD
Determining victim classes in hate crimes legislation is an essentially
political process–controversially, Jacobs and Potter go so far as to say that
the primary purpose of hate crime laws is to ‘bolster the morale and strate-
gic position of certain identity groups.’25  Thus, the problem is not simply
one of categorisation of victims, but is exacerbated by the politics of this
categorisation.  However, there is much more to this issue than simply
politics. By singling out specific groups, the legislature is sending a clear
message that these groups are deserving of more protection than others.
This means that the legislature is classifying distinct victim types as more
worthy of legal protection—legal protection which has an enormous impact
on the offender during the sentencing stage. When the legislature chooses to
discriminate between offenders, placing certain offenders into a category,
any offence against which automatically requires an enhanced sentence, it
must do so carefully, and with the principle of equality for offenders and
victims in mind.
Critics of hate crimes legislation argue that once a single group is pro-
tected under the statute, there is no end to the number of groups who will
seek protection in this way.  As Dickey notes, referring to the growth in
hate crimes legislation in the United States:
As the laws raced through the legislatures around the country, there were
few voices of dissent. In the lexicon of magic political words, being
against hate is abracadabra. Can you imagine a candidate trying to defend
against a 30-second commercial accusing him or her of being ‘soft on
hate’?26
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Hall observes that the mere process of creating categories of protected
groups is problematic.  The exclusion, he states, of any one group gives the
message that their victimisation is of less importance than any single group
included; while including every single possible group renders the legislation
meaningless.27 Jacobs and Potter observe that hate crime laws are enor-
mously appealing to politicians:
Except for the inclusion of sexual orientation, politicians faced a no lose
proposition. By supporting hate crime legislation, they could please the
advocacy group without antagonizing any lobbyists on the other side
(there were none) and without making hard budgetary choices. The hate
crime laws provided an opportunity to denounce two evils—crime and
bigotry—without offending any constituencies or spending any money.28
There are two ancillary problems here: first, as identified by Garland,
groups which are socially marginalised and stigmatised often lack recourse
to political power.29 Without this access, they will be further marginalised
in any legislative measure introduced to combat hate crimes. Secondly,
whilst oftentimes legislators will be happy to expand the ambit of hate
crimes legislation for political purposes, they can also limit its extent for the
same purposes. This occurred a number of times in the United States, where
politicians argued against the inclusion of sexual orientation in hate crimes
legislation.30 Excluding groups for political purposes can have the effect of
further marginalising the individuals and reinforcing public prejudices
against the group.
This is not all to say that popular mobilisation for legislative change is
necessarily a bad thing. It is not suggested that any of the groups protected
by hate crimes legislation are not deserving of such protection, nor that
politicians act only in a self-serving and politically expedient way. It is
argued here, however, that in considering the expansion or creation of hate
crimes legislation, the determination of protected victim groups must be
done in a manner which is objective and considered, ensuring that all
groups are protected in accordance with human rights standards.
VI. MUTABILITY AND MARGINALISATION
Oftentimes, in seeking to differentiate between victim groups, legislatures
will seek to establish which characteristics are so fundamental as to be
‘immutable.’ In seeking to determine the ‘moral fault lines’ in hate
crimes–that is, where we draw the lines between protected and unprotected
identities–Blake first refers to the United States Federal Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act.31 The Act identifies the following as
deserving protection: race, colour, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gen-
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der and sexual orientation. These, he argues, are significant because they
‘represent aspects of the person which are either immutable or, at the very
least, exceptionally difficult or costly to change.’32 These, he argues, reflect
to some degree, those classifications in ‘constitutional law.’33 However,
O’Keefe argues that ‘immutability’ is not the sole factor in determining
protected groups in hate crime legislation–religious belief, marital status
and political affiliation, which are all protected to some degree in legisla-
tion are, she argues, arguably mutable
In the United States, Lawrence examines both gender and sexual orien-
tation as characteristics which are often considered by State legislatures in
the context of hate crimes. His discussion on the latter is interesting: He
notes that the argument for excluding sexual orientation ‘has been couched
in terms of whether homosexuality is an immutable characteristic the way
race, color, ethnicity, or national origin are.’34 He finds this argument to be
flawed in a number of ways, not least because:
The problem is that this same argument could be made with respect to
religion, one of the classic bias crimes characteristics . . . The reason that
religion . . . is protected by virtually all bias crimes statutes is that we
deem it unreasonable to suggest that a Jew or Catholic might just choose
to avoid discrimination by giving up her religion.35
Thus, while immutability of characteristic seems to be one way of deter-
mining the characteristics which ought to be included in bias crimes stat-
utes, as it would be quite impolitic for a legislature to suggest that religion
is mutable, it will not be used as a solution for determining victim charac-
teristics for bias crimes statutes.
Blake takes a broader perspective. Rather than being persons who are
merely linked by ‘some personal attribute,’ social groups rather ‘offer their
members means by which they might understand their place in the social
world.’36 These groups are then in this way differentiated from ‘mere
aggregates.’37 However, when he explores this ‘self-identification’ aspect in
more detail by reference to two social groups–‘geeks’ and homeless peo-
ple–he observes that this definition is no longer feasible. Because these
individuals are identified as members of the group from the outside, they
will be targeted as such, regardless of whether they in fact identify with the
group, or even want to be associated with it. He argues:
Reducing someone to a single aspect, making them a fungible victim in
virtue of one characteristic, would seem as morally problematic when the
victim does not identify with that characteristic as when the victim uses
that characteristic as the foundation of how they see their place in the
world.38
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These remarks are particularly applicable in the context of the ‘disabled
community’: while individuals may be labelled as ‘disabled’ for the pur-
poses of the legislation, they may not in fact view themselves in this way,
seeing themselves rather as ‘differently-abled.’ Blake rejects the narrow
conception, preferring instead to favour a wider categorisation of hate
crimes. This approach, he argues, would include attacks based on the per-
ception of social difference and vulnerability more generally39 and acts of
violence based on stereotyping and hierarchy whether from within or
outside a group.40 This, he argues, would not require the victim to identify
with the group in order for the crime to be considered as one which reflects
and perpetuates bias.41
Chakraborti notes that another solution is to restrict the ambit of the
protection to minority groups.42 While he accepts that this solution as a
whole has some merit, he argues that if we accept this position, it would
mean that members of majority groups could not be protected under the
legislation, no matter how persuasive the evidence that an attack was based
on prejudice or hate.43
Others prefer to determine the ambit of hate crime laws to include only
those who, historically, have been the victims of oppression–again, in the
United States, it is argued that ‘violence against gays and the disabled, for
example, is not a badge or incident of slavery.’44  Whether the history of
racism should be determinative, however, is questionable.  As Jacobs and
Potter argue, first, on this basis, anti-white prejudice would not be treated as
a hate crime; and secondly, they ask why history of a condemnable motiva-
tion should be the basis for more punishment, and other criminal motiva-
tions, such as greed, lust, or politics not be regarded as being politically
based.45
Further, if we limit the protection afforded by the legislation to only
those classes of traditionally marginalised groups, it could be argued, as
Jacobs and Potter do, that it would be possible
to exclude from the definition of hate crime those crimes motivated by
minority group members’ prejudice against whites on the ground that
such prejudices are more justified or understandable, and the crimes less
culpable, or less destructive to the body politic than crimes by whites
against minorities.46
However, to do so, they argue, would be difficult to construct, and would
arguably violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.47 Wolfe
and Copeland refer to ‘groups of people who generally are not valued by
the majority society, who suffer discrimination in other arenas, and who do
not have full access to remedy social, political and economic injustice.’48
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This definition, however, fails to account for crimes motivated by hate
against the majority population–and again, requires a politically subjective
assessment as to the relative merits of individual social groupings.
It is argued here that the case of Sophie Lancaster, a Goth, represents
the cornerstone of any analysis of protected groups. Garland refers to the
murder of Lancaster, who the trial judge believed was targeted ‘solely
because their appearance was different’ and whose murder was labelled a
hate crime by the judge.49 Sophie and her boyfriend, Robert Maltby (who
survived the attack) had been targets of abuse before the fatal attack and it
was quite clear that the perpetrators of the offence were motivated by
prejudice against the Goth community when attacking their victims.50 Gar-
land notes that the trial judge stated, ‘This was a hate crime against these
completely harmless people targeted because their appearance was different
to yours.’51
As to the social identity, or defining characteristics of Goths, Garland
notes that Goths have both created and sustained a distinctive and tight-knit
subculture which ‘permeates almost every aspect of their daily lives and
that stays with them for decades.’52 He states:
Contemporary Goth activity therefore operates mostly autonomously
from mainstream and other stylistic subcultures, reinforcing the signifi-
cant sense of collective affiliation between Goths and their distance from
‘conventional others’.53
Further, he notes that due to their appearance, which makes them easily
identifiable as ‘other,’ they are an ‘outgroup’ prone to victimisation.54 In
summary, Garland notes:
• Goths are members of a distinct social outgroup
• Goths are repeatedly targeted as victims of abuse55
• The attack in question here was a stranger-crime
• The crime had an impact on the social confidence of the victim’s
community.56
These four elements satisfy most tests of victimhood in the context of
hate crimes. While Garland accepts that there may be difficulties in how
these issues are defined at law, he concludes:
To be targeted due to one’s difference, in whatever form this may take,
and the fear this may cause, could well be the most important facet of
these discussions. If this is the case, then some academic definitions of
hate crime may need to be rethought.57
This argument is very compelling. Agreeing with Garland, I propose a re-
thinking of hate crimes which de-politicises the process, allowing juries (or
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triers of fact) to determine whether, on the basis of the evidence before
them, a hate crime was committed, rather than curtailing the operation of
the legislation to a limited number of (albeit fully deserving) victim groups.
VII. WHO ARE THE VICTIMS?
Prior to detailing the proposed new definition, a quick examination of
the ambit of hate crimes legislation in some key jurisdictions is required.
Jurisdictionally, the definition of hate crime victims differs enormously in
three ways: first, the inclusion of different victim groups in the various
pieces of legislation (ranging from hate speech to the more usual ‘hate
crimes’); second, the manner in which hate crimes are defined and the man-
ner in which hate crime statistics are gathered; and finally, whether hate
crimes are punished at all through statute or the common law.
In England and Wales, sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder
Act 1998 define a number of offences as racially aggravated offences.  All
of them are offences already known to the law in their non-racially aggra-
vated condition. For the purpose of the sections, ‘racial group’ is defined as
‘a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (includ-
ing citizenship) or ethnic or national origins.’
The Criminal Justice Act 200358 provides that where a court is consid-
ering the seriousness of an offence other than one provided for in sections
29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and the offence is racially
aggravated, or where it involves hostility towards the victim on the basis of
their sexual orientation, disability, or religion,59 the court must treat that as
an aggravating factor, and state in open court that the offence was so aggra-
vated.  In Scotland, the Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act
2009 builds on the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Criminal Justice
(Scotland) Act 2003 by including disability, sexual orientation, and trans-
gendered identity within the protected classes of hate crimes legislation.
Article 2 of the Criminal Justice (No 2) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004
provides that where an offence was aggravated by hostility, the court must
treat that as an aggravating factor in sentencing which increases the serious-
ness of the offence, and must state in open court that that is the case.  The
offence is aggravated by hostility if the hostility is based on membership in
a racial group,60 a religious group,61 or a sexual orientation group,62 or on a
disability of the victim.63
Ireland is quite different, prohibiting only hate speech, albeit encom-
passing a wider category of victims in this limited context. Section 2 of the
Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act makes it an offence for a person to
publish or distribute material if that material is ‘threatening, abusive or
insulting’ and is either intended to, or is likely to, stir up hatred. Section 1
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of the Act defines hatred as being against a group of persons in the State or
elsewhere on account of their ‘race, colour, nationality, religion, ethnic or
national origins, membership of the travelling community or sexual
orientation.’64
The sentencing system in Ireland is a discretionary one, with few limi-
tations and even less guidance given to the Courts on sentencing issues.
The Courts have yet to find that where an attack appears to have been moti-
vated or aggravated by hate, that fact should be treated as an aggravating
factor.  Indeed, they have explicitly stated that such a motivation is not one
which should be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing. In DPP v.
Jones and Derwin,65 the Director of Public Prosecutions appealed the sen-
tencing court’s decision on the basis that it was unduly lenient, under sec-
tion 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. The first defendant was charged
with the manslaughter of a 30-year-old Chinese national. Prior to the inci-
dent which resulted in the victim receiving his injuries, a number of racial
insults were exchanged between Derwin and two Chinese men, one of
whom, Zhao Liu Tao, was the victim. The Court was asked to consider that
the sentences were unduly lenient on the basis of the need to condemn
racially motivated attacks or attacks in which race plays any part.  While
the Court admitted that it did condemn such attacks, it went on to state that
as the Director criticised only the ‘context’ in which the crime occurred
(that is, the fact that it was racially aggravated), that context did not require
a custodial sentence as a matter of principle, and further, that the sentence
was ‘fully in accordance with the principles of sentencing.’66
VIII. RETHINKING HATE CRIMES: BORROWING FROM THE
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
In the OSCE report Challenges and Responses to Hate-Motivated Inci-
dents in the OSCE Region,67 the problems around defining the protected
class in hate crimes legislation are skipped over, by including ‘other similar
factor’ after the traditional list of victims. This approach, while arguably
simplistic, has merit. If creating categories of protected groups is so fraught
with difficulties, the logical solution is to simply frame the legislation to
provide that any individual who commits a crime based on hate against a
member of an identifiable group should be prosecuted under the legislation.
This approach has a number of problems associated with it.  First, as Jacobs
and Potter quite rightly point out, prejudice is pervasive, and plays a role of
some kind in a large percentage of crimes.68  Further, if the sole basis of a
hate crime is the prejudice itself, then it could be argued that anyone could
claim that he or she was a victim of a hate crime, and thus, the application
of the term is limitless. As Hall observes, there is a danger that the very
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concept of such an offence would lose its meaning.69  This approach, pri-
oritising the ‘hate’ or prejudicial element of hate crimes offences, could
lead to a situation where prejudice on the basis of any identifying character-
istic or personality trait could justify the prosecution of a hate crime.  If we
consider the traditional targets of playground bullies—rich, poor, clever,
stupid, fat, thin, ugly, and pretty–where would the line be drawn between a
crime and a crime motivated by hate? It is argued here, however, that by re-
prioritising hostility, as opposed to victim characteristics, as the core foun-
dation of hate crimes statues, we will have hate crimes which are inclusive
and protective, rather than exclusive and discriminatory.
It has been said that, by discriminating between victims and treating
crimes motivated by prejudice more harshly, we are seeking to promote
social equality through the criminal justice system.70 While legislation
which penalises discriminatory behaviour from the perspective of the civil
law is useful, hate crimes ‘reflect the increasing acceptance of the idea that
criminal conduct is “different” when it involves an act of discrimination.’71
It is argued here, however, that it is possible to criminalise such behaviour
and retain the message that is central to hate crimes, whilst simultaneously
avoiding the creation of hierarchies of victims on the statute book.
The criminal law has proven itself capable of identifying core personal
characteristics through the operation of the defence of provocation.72 Tradi-
tionally, when the defence of provocation was argued, law in England and
Wales required the ‘reasonable man’ (against whose temper the provoking
remark will be tested) to be endowed with the characteristics of the accused
that the jury thought
would affect the gravity of the provocation to him, and that the question
is not merely whether such a person would in like circumstances be pro-
voked to lose his self-control but also whether he would react to the prov-
ocation as the accused did.73
Characteristics which were found to be relevant in this context include:
• Age
• Gender
• Race
• Ethnic origin
• Sexual orientation
• Religious affiliation
• Physical infirmity
• Drug addiction
• Criminal record
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• Paedophile tendencies
• Mental infirmity.74
Thus, no matter how distasteful or socially unacceptable the ‘personal
characteristic,’ the jury would consider the provoking event from the per-
spective of an individual endowed with such characteristics. Juries were
entirely capable of determining which characteristics should be considered,
and it was accepted that we have faith in them as triers of fact to do so. As
was stated in R v. Smith (Morgan):75
The jury is entitled to act upon its own opinion of whether the objective
element of provocation has been satisfied and the judge is not entitled to
tell them that for this purpose the law requires them to exclude from
consideration any of the circumstances or characteristics of the
accused.76
Using this approach, the law is then capable of adapting to social and cul-
tural changes. The question as to which characteristics should be taken into
account or not is unclear: it is arguable that morally questionable character-
istics should be taken into account, such as paedophilic tendencies. Ash-
worth states:
Does this mean that there are not boundaries at all to what personal attrib-
utes may be taken into account in assessing the gravity of the provoca-
tion? What about the case of a racist who believes that it is gravely
insulting for a non-white person to speak to a white man unless spoken to
first? . . . [T]he judgement of such matters must be left to the jury without
much guidance . . . [T]hat is unsatisfactory: there ought to be a normative
element that excludes attributes and reactions inconsistent with the law or
inconsistent with the notion of a tolerant, pluralist society that upholds
the right to respect for private life without discrimination.77
This normative element was not introduced in the Coroners and Justice Act
2009, section 54 of which replaced the defence of provocation with the
partial defence of loss of control. Section 54(1) provides that where there
was a loss of control resulting from an act or omission of the defendant,
which loss of control had a qualifying trigger, and a person of the defend-
ants sex and age, ‘and in the circumstances’ of the defendant would have
reacted in the same way (i.e., lost control), the defendant can rely on the
defence. The circumstances of the defendant are defined in section 54(3) as
‘all of [the defendant’s] circumstances other than those whose only rele-
vance to [the defendant’s conduct] is that they bear on [the defendant’s]
general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint.’
It is argued here that this manner of assessing defining or personal
characteristics from the perspective of the defence of provocation  can be
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easily applied in a context where the jury (or judge) determine whether a
bias crime was committed against the accused on the basis of a ‘defining
characteristic’ or ‘personal characteristic.’ The legislation could be framed
as depending on
whether the jury believe that the motivation behind the criminal offence
was based on hostility towards the victim, hostility which was directed at
the victim because of their personal characteristics (or presumed charac-
teristics), characteristics of which he or she shares with an identifiable
social group.
This approach, I believe, would allow courts broad discretion in determin-
ing whether a bias crime occurred in a particular instance, thus allowing
crimes against the homeless, Goths, and the elderly to be considered hate
crimes, while simultaneously avoiding the problem whereby a ‘hate crime’
is said to occur where prejudicial language is used in the course of an
attack, where that attack was not in any way motivated by bias. It could be
argued that this definition is too wide, or that it will protect victims who are
not morally or socially entitled to such protection. However, if the true pur-
pose of a bias crime statute is to seek to deter crimes which are motivated
by bias against a group, then this approach seems logical. It is an approach
which is known to the law, and which juries are capable of applying.
In order to provide Ashworth’s normative element, it is argued that the
legislation should include the nine protected characteristics included in
equality legislation as indicative characteristics, or presumptive characteris-
tics, but allow the jury or trier of fact to include other characteristics where
it deems it appropriate—or, to use the language of the OSC—include the
‘other similar factor’ element. Thus, the legislation would define ‘personal
characteristics’ as those protected in the equality legislation ‘or any other
similar factor.’ This approach is commendable as it includes an element of
consistency in the law, while simultaneously avoiding the politics of assess-
ing which characteristics should be considered protected or not by bias
crime statutes. It will also provide Ashworth’s ‘normative element’ to the
legislation, allowing the trier of facts to determine whether, after consider-
ing all aspects of the case, a hate crime was in fact committed, without
being hamstrung by politicised and narrow categories of victims.
In Ireland, equality legislation deals with discrimination on nine
grounds:
• Gender
• Civil status (i.e., marital status or civil partnership status)
• Family status
• Age
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• Race
• Religion
• Disability
• Sexual orientation
• Membership of the travelling community.78
The Equality Act 2010 in Great Britain similarly recognises the fol-
lowing as protected characteristics:79
• Age
• Disability
• Gender reassignment
• Marriage and civil partnership
• Pregnancy and maternity
• Race
• Religion or belief
• Sex
• Sexual orientation.80
In this sense, the law already recognises and protects categories of
individuals; it seems logical to extend the breadth of these categories to hate
crimes victims. Other classes could be included where the trier of fact
deems it necessary: Goths, geeks and the homeless could all be victims of
hate crime using this broad definition. This approach also deals with inter-
group and mixed-group hate crimes.
Admittedly, the solution proposed is not perfect. It does not, however,
deal with attacks on the basis of an absence of a characteristic, such as
religion. Similarly, it does not deal with individuals who are attacked due to
their association with a group; an offender may well target such an individ-
ual, not because the attacker mistakes the person as a member of the group
(for example, a straight woman with a gay man; a white woman with a
black man), but because they are associating with that group. Further, peo-
ple can belong to many difference communities, and thus have multiple
identities and, as Chakraborti notes, ‘be prone to multiple forms of
victimization.’81
IX. DEVELOPING THE ‘SIMILAR FACTOR’ ELEMENT
While this approach does have merits, the Canadian experience high-
lights a potential problem for such a legislative development. Section
718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code provides that where there is evidence that
an offence was motivated by bias, prejudice, or hate based on race, national
or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical
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disability, sexual orientation, or any other similar factor, that this should be
considered an aggravating factor in sentencing.
Roberts and Hastings speculated on how the ‘any other similar factor’
element should be interpreted, referring to the media example of a criminal
attack on a physician who was engaged in performing abortions.82 They
first determined the ‘common element’ in the enumerated characteristics in
section 718.2(a)(i), and noted that as both ascribed and choice-based factors
are included, ‘the only common element is that they relate to groups or
communities rather than individuals.’83 Thus, they argued that the provi-
sions in question apply where the attack is aimed at ‘an entire community’
rather than at an individual: ‘It matters little whether the community is
defined by occupation belief or lifestyle.’84 This approach seems sensible,
being sufficiently broad to incorporate a Sophie Lancaster-type attack,
while simultaneously limiting the application of the section to only those
crimes which would truly be considered ‘hate crimes.’
In the context of the application of section 718.2(a)(i) in the Courts,
there have been very few cases concerning the meaning of ‘other similar
factor.’ Indeed, Lawrence and Verdun-Jones note that, with one exception,
no ‘other similar factor’ has been recognised.85 The exception they mention
is in one of two related cases, R v. JS86 and R v. Cran87 where the Court
considered whether section 718.2(a)(i) applied.88 In the first case, the
Crown had stated that there was no way of establishing that the case consti-
tuted a ‘hate crime’ for the purposes of the section. Romilly J disagreed. He
stated:
It strikes me that this section contemplates hatred against ‘peeping toms’
and/or ‘voyeurs’ as being within its purview, since in my opinion such
activity represents a sexual lifestyle which some may consider deviant,
but it is a sexual lifestyle all the same.89
On this reasoning, then, Romilly J believed that (deviant) sexual lifestyles
were of a ‘similar’ nature to one’s (immutable) sexual orientation.90 How-
ever, he went on to state that, as a gay man was attacked in an area fre-
quented by gay men (a fact which was known to the defendant), ‘I fail to
see why it cannot be regarded as a “gay bashing.”’ This reasoning does not
sit easily with the earlier statement: On this basis, the defendant knew (or
ought to have known) that the victim was gay, and that the motivation for
attacking him was his homosexual orientation, rather than the fact that he
was a peeping tom.
In Cran, the Court was faced with exactly the same facts, and the ques-
tion again was whether the defendant should be subject to the enhanced
penalty provisions. Humphries J first observed that the Crown did not rely
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on or refer to section 718.2(a)(i) in either the instant case or either of the
cases before the youth court. She observed that there was no evidence
before the Court that the motive for the attack was the sexual orientation of
the victim. In fact, she stated that the motive for the attack seems to have
been the defendant’s desire to attack ‘peeping toms.’ Humphries J stated,
‘There is . . . no basis on the evidence before the court to equate ‘peeping
toms and voyeurs’ to gay people in the mind of Ryan Cran in the absence of
evidence and in the face of evidence to the contrary.’91
Lawrence and Verdun-Jones note that, whilst Romilly J articulated ‘an
analogous ground’ for the application of the legislation, Humphries J
applied a ‘strict construction’ of the language used in the section, as she
was unwilling to extend the protection in the legislation to a group ‘in the
absence of evidence linking the group targeted by the accused to one of the
groups listed in the section itself.’92 Neither of these approaches is particu-
larly useful. To say that ‘peeping toms’ are an ‘analogous group’ to the gay
community is both offensive and harmful to that latter community. How-
ever, to restrict the ambit of the legislation as narrowly as Humphries J did
means that the section will have rather limited application.
Perhaps a more appropriate way for Humphries J to assess the question
was to, first, ask if Cran attacked the victim because of his perceived mem-
bership of a group, regardless of whether that group has protected status.
Second, then, the court should ask whether that group is deserving of inclu-
sion in section 718.2(a)(i)–or to use Roberts and Hastings’ approach, to
determine if peeping toms constitute a community. However, determining if
a group should be protected by asking of they are the same as, or even
analogous to, a protected group (the ‘equation’ of peeping toms and gay
people) is not, it is argued, an appropriate approach. Rather, once it is estab-
lished that the individual was attacked due to some characteristic he or she
shares with an identifiable social group, the presumption should be that the
case falls within the ambit of section 718.2(a)(i).
In what could be called the ‘sister’ provisions to hate crimes legisla-
tion, section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides
for the guarantee of equality and ‘in particular’ prohibits discrimination on
the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or
mental or physical disability, and the development of the ‘analogous
grounds’ provision is useful in this context. In Andrews v. Law Society of
British Columbia93 the Court noted that the enumerated grounds applied to
‘the most common and probably the most socially destructive and histori-
cally practised bases of discrimination.’94 While of some utility, this test
could be considered quite narrow: arguably, the Sophie Lancaster case
might not be considered to fall within the parameters of the test. Unsurpris-
ingly, the Supreme Court of Canada took a different approach to the test in
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Miron v. Trudel.95 Here, the Court rejected the ‘historical disadvantage’
test, and while recognising the utility of what the Court in Andrews said,
McLachlin J stated:
[A]nalogous grounds cannot be confined to historically disadvantaged
groups; if the Charter is to remain relevant to future generations, it must
retain a capacity to recognize new grounds of discrimination. Nor is it
essential that the analogous ground target a discrete and insular minority;
this is belied by the inclusion of sex as a ground enumerated in s. 15(1).
And while discriminatory group markers often involve immutable char-
acteristics, they do not necessarily do so . . . All these and more may be
indicators of analogous grounds, but the unifying principle is larger: the
avoidance of stereotypical reasoning and the creation of legal distinctions
which violate the dignity and freedom of the individual, on the basis of
some preconceived perception about the attributed characteristics of a
group rather than the true capacity, worth or circumstances of the
individual.96
Thus, rather than restricting the application of section 15 to only those
groups which are determined to have been the subject of historical discrimi-
nation, the development of ‘analogous grounds’ is quite open, and instead
has at its heart the human rights and civil liberties of individuals.97
While Roberts and Hastings’ early analysis is persuasive, the jurispru-
dence from the courts on this issue in relation to section 718.2(a)(i) is
underdeveloped, and an application of the early jurisprudence in relation to
section 15 would lead to a narrow interpretation of the ‘similar factor’ pro-
vision. If the approach suggested in this article is adopted, some guidance
on the interpretation of ‘any other similar factor’ should be given in an
interpretation section. The term could well be defined as ‘any community,
social, or organised group with identifiable and shared characteristics.’
Again, this would provide for a test which places the concerns of the disci-
pline of hate studies at its core, that is, the desire to combat the dehumanisa-
tion of the other, while simultaneously being inclusive and non-
discriminatory.
X. CONCLUSION
By creating hierarchies of victims in hate crimes statutes, the criminal
justice system discriminates arbitrarily between social groups. It is argued
here that there is no logic in including sexual orientation as a defining char-
acteristic, but excluding transgendered or transsexuals. The law is slow to
change, and the criminal law even slower: It is a blunt instrument which
should be applied with care and due regard to principles of equality and
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respect for the private life of citizens. By allowing juries or triers of fact to
establish if a hate crime actually occurred on a case-by-case basis, we will
ensure that all victim classes are equally protected by the law, and that no
hate crime will go unpunished.
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